ASSET MARKETS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH PROVISION POINTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY by Enrique Fatas et al.
ASSET MARKETS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES WITH PROVISION
POINTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
 *
Bruno Broseta, Enrique Fatás, Tibor Neugebauer
**
WP-AD 2001-29
Correspondence to E. Fatás: LINEEX, Universidad de Valencia, Campus Tarongers, 46022 Valencia (Spain).
Fatas@uv.es..
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A.
First Edition November 2001
Depósito Legal: V-4663-2001
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research  under way in  order to encourage a
discussion process before sending them to scientific journals for their final publication.
                                                            
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Vice President for Research’s Small
Grants Program at the University of Arizona (FRS-466477), Project PB98-1051-C02-02 of the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Culture, the Valencia Institute for Economic Research (Ivie) 2000 Research Grant and Project
GV98-08-2960 of the Valencia Regional Government. The authors thank Nikos Georgantzis, Jordi Brandts,
Susan  Laury,  Rob  Moir, Gonzalo  Olcina,  Giovanni  Ponti,  Arthur  Schram,  Rachel  Croson  and  seminar
participants at Amsterdam, Paris, Magdeburg, Castellon and Valencia for helpful comments.
** B. Broseta: Organismo Público Valenciano de Investigación (OPVI) and LINEEX; E. Fatás: LINEEX and
University of Valencia; T. Neugebauer: University of York and LINEEX.1
ASSET MARKETS AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN PUBLIC GOODS
GAMES WITH PROVISION POINTS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Bruno Broseta, Enrique Fatás and Tibor Neugebauer
A B S T R A C T
In this paper we report some experimental results on the effects that auctioning the
right to play a public goods game with a provision point may have on equilibrium selection
and efficiency. A control treatment reveals that, as in the experimental literature for similar
environments, subjects’ behavior converges to the inefficient outcome whenever they are
endowed with the right to play the game. However, auctioning off such a right among a larger
population of players has a significant efficiency-enhancing effect. Once the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium in the second stage is reached, the auction price at the first stage increases to its
upper limit, dissipating all players’ gains associated with the provision of the public good.
The full contribution equilibrium was extremely robust: individual subjects’ deviations from
the equilibrium strategy were not able to force lower market prices and did not affect
provision of the public good in subsequent periods.
KEYWORDS: Public Goods; Provision Points; Experimental Markets.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Public good provision is a fundamental source of market failure, since the non-
excludability  property of such a good makes it possible to consume it for free, once it is
supplied. Thus, in the familiar voluntary contribution mechanism (henceforth VCM) model,
free-riding (i.e., zero contribution) is a dominant strategy and the resulting equilibrium is
socially sub-optimal. The introduction of provision points eliminates the strict dominance of
free-riding and generates a multiplicity of pure strategy equilibria, which, when symmetric,
are Pareto-ranked.
In the experimental literature on the standard VCM
1 different mechanisms have been
studied to favor higher voluntary contributions and, eventually, reach efficient outcomes.
Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985) found evidence for higher provision levels of a public good
due to higher marginal per capita returns (MPCR). Repetition, on the other hand, was found to
induce an increase in free riding behavior. Isaac and Walker (1988) showed that face-to-face
communication might be effective  in producing efficient allocations of the public good in
repeated play; and that even after communication ceased in subsequent repetitions, a high
provision level may still be sustained. Isaac and Walker (1991) reported that costly face-to-
face communication also enhanced the voluntary contribution to the public good.
The introduction of provision points also seems to enhance contribution levels. In the
seminal work of Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989) the introduction of provision points
proved to enhance voluntary contribution to the public good, although the provision point
was, in fact, almost never reached in absence of a money back guarantee
2. Interestingly
enough, if the public good was not provided in the initial periods decay in contributions
followed, suggesting convergence of subjects´ choices to the inefficient outcome.
The effects of institutional changes in the rule of the game on the efficiency of the
resulting equilibrium outcomes have also been analyzed in the experimental literature. Isaac,
Schmidtz and Walker (1989)´s Experimental Design II and Bagnoli and McKee (1991) found
additional evidence of the contribution enhancing effect of provision points in the presence of
a money back guarantee. Marks and Croson (1998) studied the positive effect of rebate rules
while Croson and Marks (1999) found no significant differences in the rate of successful
provision  with  incomplete information about other subjects’ valuations  of  the  public  good.
                                                                
1 See Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995) for a review of the experimental literature on public goods
games.
2 In the case of a money back guarantee, any endowment subjects contribute to the public good is refunded (as if
they had invested in the individual exchange) if the provision point is not obtained.3
Finally, Cadsby and  Maynes (1999) found that continuity in group contributions, higher
rewards, and higher thresholds in the presence of money back guarantees also encourage
public good provision.
Very similar issues have been analyzed –both by experimentalists and by theorists- in
the context of coordination games in which the existence of multiple and, usually, Pareto-
ranked Nash  equilibria pose both coordination and efficiency problems. In particular, the
influence that strategic uncertainty –or players´ uncertainty about each others´ choices- might
have on the efficiency of coordination outcomes has been studied experimentally by Van
Huyck, Battalio and Beil (henceforth, “VHBB”) (1990,1991) and analyzed among others, by
Crawford (1995) and Broseta (2000). Almost simultaneously, a growing body of experimental
evidence (Cooper et al. (1992a, 1992b), Cachon and Camerer (1996), VHBB (1993)) focused
on how  preplay communication may improve the efficiency of coordination outcomes.  In
particular, in VHBB (1993)´s remarkable experimental designs, the right to play a
coordination game was auctioned off amongst the subjects, yielding powerful and systematic
gains in the efficiency of coordination outcomes with respect to the environment in which the
players were directly endowed with the right to play and identical coordination game.
In this paper, the contribution enhancing effect of implicit pre-play communication of
this kind in a public goods game with a threshold is at issue.  In particular, we exploit the
structural similarities existing between a VCM with provision points and some coordination
games in which strategic uncertainty plays an important role in equilibrium selection (like
those analized in VHBB (1990, 1991)) to test, using experimental methods, whether the
introduction of a competitive market can increase  subjects´ contributions and, eventually,
yield an efficient provision level for the public good. In this sense, our work can be seen as an
extension, and thus as an indirect test of the robustness, of VHBB (1993)´s market driven,
efficiency-enhancing mechanism to the provision of public goods with provision points.
Following Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1993), an asset market is implemented by means of
an English clock multiple-unit auction, in which prices signal subjects’ willingness to play a
public good game in the second stage. Our experimental results for a control treatment show
that, when subjects are endowed with the right to play the VCM with a Provision Point, the
efficient equilibrium -full provision of the public good- obtains in only 3 out of 12
experimental runs. In all the remaining sessions (9 out of 12 experiments), the dynamics were
consistent with the previous experimental results for similar environments
3: initial (average)
group contributions may amount up to 75-80% of the provision level, only to decline
progressively as the game is repeated. By period 20, the last in our experimental design, less
                                                                
3 See, for example, Isaac et al. (1989) or Cadsby and Maynes (1999).4
than one subject on average was playing his/her efficient equilibrium strategy in 8 out of the 9
runs in which play appeared to converge towards the inefficient equilibrium.
The results for this same environment when the right to play is auctioned off among a
larger group of players are remarkably different. First of all, the results suggest that subjects´
play converged towards the efficient equilibrium in 7 out of 12 experiments, including  3 runs
in which the outcomes for the initial periods were inefficient. In only one case did the
dynamics converge to the inefficient equilibrium in which the public good was not provided.
Thus, the introduction of a game form auction as a first stage appears to significantly affect
equilibrium selection in  the  VCM with a provision point, as compared with the control
treatment.
The evolution of the market prices subjects had to pay to enter the VCM-PP is also
noteworthy. In the initial periods, market prices for all 12 experiments were always at –or
above- the payoff that any individual player could obtain from the inefficient outcome but
also, with few exceptions, below the payoff a subject playing the VCM in the second stage
could obtain from the efficient, full provision equilibrium.  Clearly, subjects playing the latter
equilibrium might profit from such a situation in the two-stage game, while disequilibrium
behavior would imply zero (or even negative) payoffs. As the number of repetitions
increased, however, market prices tended to rise until players´ surplus was, in the efficient
equilibrium, zero or negligible
4. Finally, we also observed that the competitive pressures
induced by the first stage game also resulted in that the efficient outcome of the VCM was,
when reached, extremely robust to individual deviations from the equilibrium strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we briefly discuss the
class of environments analyzed in the rest of the paper. Section 3 presents the experimental
design. The experimental results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 provides our concluding
remarks.
2. GENERAL FRAMEWORK: THE VCM WITH PROVISION POINTS
We consider the following standard, symmetric VCM with a provision point and
discrete contribution levels. Each member of a group of  n agents, receives an initial
endowment ei = e ( i = 1 ,..,n) and is asked to privately (and simultaneously) allocate it
                                                                
4  Subjects´ payoffs in the two-stage game also tended to 0 when behavior converged to the inefficient
equilibrium of the second stage, VCM game.5
between a contribution ci ˛ {0,..,e} to the provision of a public good and a remainder, e-ci, to
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The structure of the set of Nash equilibria for this game depends on the value of the
threshold C
*; in all cases, however, there is a multiplicity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In
what follows we concentrate our analysis on the case of  C C
* =  (“High Provision Point”). In
this case,  the game (denoted as VCM-HPP) has only two symmetric (and strictly  Pareto-
ranked) pure strategy equilibria in which ci = e and ci = 0 for all i respectively, and no pure-
strategy asymmetric equilibria
5.
There is a substantial structural similarity between the VCM-HPP game described here
and a well-known coordination game, the Stag-Hunt Game, which suggests that strategic
uncertainty may play a key role in equilibrium selection in this type of environment. To see
why, consider the simplified (all or nothing) VCM-HPP in which ci = {0;e} for all  i, with
payoffs given by (1), and with  C C
* = . This game has two strict - and Pareto-ranked - Nash
equilibria, in which ci = e (the efficient equilibrium, with individual payoffs  P P i e e ( ,..., ) = )
and ci = 0 (with payoffs P i e ( ,..., ) 0 0 = ) for all i = 1,..,n and  e > P . Even though there are no
incentive problems to sustain the efficient equilibrium, the players do face a non-trivial
coordination problem because this type of environment pits collective rationality (or
efficiency) against individual players’ risk of lower payoffs associated with their uncertainty
about each other’s choices, or strategic uncertainty. In the presence of strategic uncertainty,
an individually rational player will weight the higher payoff of choosing (in equilibrium) the
                                                                
5 The game has no asymmetric equilibria because any contribution level  ci such that 0 <  ci  < e  is strictly
dominated by contributing ci = 0. We will often use this property below -when analyzing equilibria of the VCM-
HPP- so as to simplify the discussion by considering only ‘all or nothing’ contribution levels ci˛ {0,e}.6




, with the risk of a lower payoff -in
fact, a payoff of 0- when a single player shirks and contributes 0
6. In other words, players’
strategies are optimal only when they are based on identical beliefs about how the game will
be played.
Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989)´s Experimental Design I analyzed this type of
VCM-HPP, referring to the influence strategic uncertainty might have on subjects´ behavior
as “the assurance problem”. The following general features of their results are noteworthy.
First, the initial group contribution levels were significantly positive, well above the 0-level
implied by the inefficient equilibrium but, with one exception
7, were below the provision
point and thus insufficient to insure provision of the public good. Second, group contributions
decayed –relatively fast-, so that behavior appeared to converge to the inefficient equilibrium:
in the last two periods (out of a total of 10), the group contribution was 0 in 5 out of 6
experiments. From these data, Isaac et al. (1989) concluded that the assurance problem better
described the patterns of equilibrium selection they observed in the VCM-HPP.
This experimental evidence, coupled with the structural similarities between the
VCM-HPP and the Stag-Hunt Game discussed above, suggest that strategic uncertainty may
play an important role in equilibrium selection in the former type of environment. The
profound impact that strategic uncertainty may have on the emergence of inefficient outcomes
in games with multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria has been studied by Crawford (1995)
and Broseta (2000) for the class of experimental coordination games in Van Huyck, Battalio
and Beil (1990, 1991). Following a related line of research, a growing body of experimental
literature has focused on how different (implicit) preplay communication mechanisms and
institutions may, often along the lines of forward-induction type of arguments, alleviate the
effects of strategic uncertainty and increase the efficiency of coordination outcomes.
Cooper, De Jong, Forsythe and Ross (1992a) observed that in a 2-person Stag-Hunt
Game experiment, the inefficient, secure strategy obtained in 325 out of 330 plays. However,
coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium was enhanced considerably through one-
way communication and achieved, 97% of the time, by means of two-way communication. In
an extension of this work, Cooper et al. (1992b) implemented an outside option which, once
foregone by (some of) the players would, under the logic of forward induction, induce the
efficient equilibrium. Their experimental results showed that this particular form of implicit
pre-play communication may help the subjects to reach the efficient equilibrium in a 2-person
                                                                
6 Note that a player can insure himself a payoff of e by not contributing at all.
7 In one experiment (out of six) the subjects locked-in the efficient equilibrium starting from period 2 on.7
Stag-Hunt game more frequently than explicit one-way communication; nevertheless, two-
way communication still produced even better results.
Cachon and Camerer (1996) retake two of  VHBB´s (1990, 1991) environments –the
large-group minimum game and the median game- and analyze the effects that charging entry
fees to the players before playing the coordination game may have on efficiency. In  their
“Must Play” treatment, all subjects are charged a commonly known fee to play the game. In
their “Opt Out“ treatment, the entry fee was also publicly announced but players were given
the chance to opt out, avoid paying the cost and receive a zero payoff for that round
8. They
found that the efficiency of coordination increased for  the median game in both treatments,
while only the Opt Out design was effective in this sense in the minimum Game.
Finally, VHBB´s (1993) remarkable experimental results show how competition for
the right to play may greatly enhance efficiency in a class of coordination games they had
considered in their earlier 1991 paper. More precisely, VHBB designed a 2 stage (repeated)
game in which the right to play the n-person coordination game was auctioned off among a
larger population of players in the first stage of the game. The results could then be compared
with those of their 1991 designs, in which  the same number of subjects were simply endowed
with the right to play an identical coordination game. The results were striking: when the
game was played without auctions, behavior in all experiments converged to inefficient
equilibrium outcomes. When the right to play was auctioned off among the players, the
subjects bid up –without exception- the market-clearing price to a level recoverable only in
the efficient equilibrium, and then converged to that equilibrium. As Crawford and Broseta
(1998) suggest, this experiment suggests a potentially important new way in which
competition may improve efficiency; but it also seems reasonable to test the robustness of the
efficiency-enhancing mechanism designed by VHBB in environments beyond those that
directly generalize their 1993 experimental designs.
This paper is an attempt to do so, extending VHBB´s (1993) designs to the provision
of public goods and, in particular, to the VCM-HPP game described above. We now discuss
our experimental designs.
                                                                
8 Note that in both treatments, losses are possible (even in equilibrium) whenever the entry fee is set higher than
the lowest-paying equilibrium payoff.8
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We conducted two experimental treatments. The purpose of the control treatment was
to established a baseline for the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism with a Provision Point
(VCM-HPP), in which the subjects are endowed with the right to play the public goods game.
In the second treatment we introduce the Two-Stage VCM-HPP (TS-VCM-HPP), in which
the right to play the game is, at the first stage of the game, auctioned off amongst a larger
population of players using, as in VHBB (1993), an ascending bid English Clock Auction.
3.1. The control treatment.
We set n = 4, e = 40 and a =1 in the standard VCM-HPP described in section 2, with
all payoffs expressed in experimental currency units (ECU)
9. The payoff from contributing to
the public good is chosen as G(C
*)= 2.5 x C
* (so that the MPCR is 0.625), and C* =ne=160.
Each experiment consisted of the same group of 4 subjects, interacting independently and
anonymously for twenty periods. Hence, in every period of the VCM-HPP, the four subjects
had an initial endowment of 40 ECU and would decide how much to contribute to the
provision of the public good, with individual contributions restricted to the set
{0;10;20;30;40} ECU. The public good is provided only if each subject contributes her or his
total endowment of 40 ECU. Therefore, individual  subjects´ equilibrium payoffs are 40
ECU´s in the inefficient equilibrium and 100 ECU´s in the efficient outcome, in which the
threshold is reached and full provision occurs. Otherwise, any subject’s payoff will be the
difference between the initial endowment, e, and her/his contribution.
The resulting payoff list ,as shown to the experimental subjects, is the following:
Figure 1. Payoff matrix in the public goods game with provision point
GROUP CONTRIBUTION
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
0 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 Individual
contribution 10 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
                                                                
9 The exchange rate was 1 ECU = 2 ptas in the standard VCM; and 1 ECU = 8 ptas in the two-stage game. In the
experimental treatment with the two-stage game, subjects were given an initial capital balance of 200 ECU.
Possible losses they would make were remitted.9
We conducted 3 sessions of the control treatment, each of which consisted of four
groups of four subjects interacting at the same time. The subjects were randomly paired for
the duration of the experiment, were not able to figure out who their partners were, and
members of the same group never sat next to each other.
Common information was established by reading instructions out loud and using an
overhead projector to display the software interface (see Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix).
During the experiments, all the subjects received the following information through their
computer terminals: after each round, each player was informed about his/her group
contribution to the public good, his/her individual contribution and his/her individual payoff
for that round. In addition, all the subjects had unrestricted access, at all times, to the history
of these variables –together with each player´s cumulative payoff- for all previous rounds.
We also screened our experimental subjects in order to insure comprehension of the
rules of the game and of the software interface. From the population of potential subjects
who showed up for the experiment, 16 were chosen to participate in each session, according
to the following procedures: at the end of the introductory session, in which the instructions
were read aloud and the software was explained, participants had to fill in a brief
questionnaire (see Appendix).
 The sixteen who performed best in the test (we randomized in
case of ties) were brought to the laboratory where they were randomly assigned to computer
terminals; the others were asked to leave, and were paid the show up fee
10.
3.2. Second Treatment: The Two-Stage Game.
In our second treatment, the right to play the same VCM-HPP as described above was
auctioned among a larger subject pool. In other words, at this first stage, N>n players are
given the opportunity to purchase in an asset market the right to participate in the second
stage, so that only n players are selected to play the second stage VCM-HPP. The other N-n
players exit the game (and are not allowed to re-enter the auction until the following period),
and receive a payoff of zero for that round. As in VHBB (1993), the asset market consists of
an English-clock multiple unit auction which, in our case, was run on the computer (see the
interface in the Appendix III).  The auction clock starts at an initial (non-negative) price and is
successively increased at regular time intervals. The current bid price is publicly announced
(so that it is common information), and players simultaneously decide whether to bid the price
in order to (possibly) enter the second stage or to exit the auction. The clock stops when at
most n players are willing to pay the current price, so that the winners are the n players who
                                                                
10 Whether they participated or not, subjects were all paid a show-up fee of 750 pesetas (about US$ 5) which
included 250 ptas for the participation in the test.10
longest stay in the auction. The last bid price at which at most n players remain in the auction
determines the cost that the n winners in the auction have to incur to enter the second stage of
the game. If more than n players bid the maximum price, or if at the time the clock is stopped
less than n players continue in the auction, the n winners are determined randomly, as detailed
below.
The auction mechanism was implemented as follows. In any given experiment, the
initial population was set to N=8, while n=4 as in the control treatment. The starting bid was 5
ECU´s less than the payoff in the lowest-paying equilibrium in the VCM-HPP (i.e., 35 ECU).
Every 5 seconds the current price was raised, up to a maximum of 100  ECU´s. Price
increments were set equal to 5 ECU´s until either two subjects, out of the initial eight, had
exited the auction or until a price of 95 ECU´s was reached, at which point they were lowered
to 1 ECU
11. At each stage of the auction, the subjects were asked to confirm their willingness
to pay the announced price or to exit
12. Once they had exited, they were not able to enter
again and had to wait until the following period. The auction stopped either i) if four or less
subjects remained in it, or ii) if the price had reached its maximum. In the first case, if exactly
four subjects had confirmed to bid the latest announced price, they entered immediately the
second stage; if less bidders remained, the quota was completed randomly with additional
subjects from those who exited at the last price. In the second case, the four subjects to enter
the second stage were selected at random among those who had confirmed to pay the
maximum price. In any case, the market price to be paid for entering the second stage game
was fixed at the ultimate bid held by at least four bidders.
We conducted 6 sessions, with two groups of eight subjects each, so that the available
data for the TS-VCM-HPP include 12 experiments. In each experiment, the two-stage game
was repeated 20 times. The experimental procedures were identical to those in the control
treatment, with the following exceptions. First, the quiz used to screen the subjects included
some questions on the auction mechanism. Second, the information available to the subjects
in each auction round included the current price, the number of active bidders in the auction
and the final market price (see the software interface in the Appendix III); for those subjects
who entered the VCM-HPP at the second stage, the same information as in the control
treatment was available for the current round; similarly, the history of all past outcomes and
individual payoffs was also available to all subjects.
                                                                
11 In our first two sessions (experiments TS-VCM-HPP 1–4), price increments were also 1 ECU after only 6
subjects remained in the auction, but were not automatically lowered from 5 ECU to 1 ECU after a price of 95
was reached. Price resolution was increased as noted in the text for all remaining experiments.
12 The instructions specified that, by default, if a subject did not enter his/her decision within the specified time
period (5 seconds) he/she would be assumed to remain in the auction.11
All experiments were conducted in the laboratory at the University of Valencia
(LINEEX)
13. Subjects were recruited among undergraduate students of economics and
business at the University of Valencia through posted, public advertisements. They were all
inexperienced in that they had not participated previously in public goods or auction
experiments; for most of them it was the first experiment at all. A total of 144 students
participated in the experiments reported here, all of them only once. No communication in
any way between subjects was permitted during the course of a session. One session of the
control treatment took approximately one hour, while about two hours were needed to run the
TS-VCM-HPP treatment. By participating in these experiments, subjects earned an average of
2500 pesetas (US$ 15), in addition to the show-up fee.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1. The control treatment (VCM-HPP): Results.
The results for the 12 experiments (with 20 rounds each) of the control treatment, in
which subjects were endowed with the right to play the VCM-HPP, are summarized in Figure
2. Table 1, in Appendix I, includes the raw data, together with some aggregate statistics of
interest.
Subjects´ behavior in the initial rounds of the control treatment is consistent with
previous research (see, for example, Isaac et al. (1989)): in period 1, the average group
contribution reaches 81% of the level required to provide the public good, while the
inefficient equilibrium outcome is never observed. To the contrary, the efficient equilibrium is
attained in 3 out of 12 experiments (respectively 3, 5 and 12), while a group contribution of
150 (given the players’ strategy basis, the closest possible outcome to the provision of the
public good) occurs in two additional ones (experiments 4 and 6).
Our data also reveal some interesting features about the dynamics of  players´
choices
14. First, individual contribution levels clearly decline across time (with the exceptions
noted below) and, using some caution given that data on only 20 periods are available,
behavior appears to converge to the inefficient outcome, also as in the related literature. From
period 10 onwards, the modal strategy choice is zero contribution to the public exchange.
And, by period 20, the average group contribution (excluding experiments 5, 10 and 12 in
which  behavior  converges  to  the efficient outcome) is 33.3, approximately 21% of the level
                                                                
13 The software was programmed by means of Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)’s RatImage￿, Version 3.30.
14 For the trajectory of average contributions a Spearman rank correlation coefficient of -0.86 can be calculated.
Thus, the hypothesis of time independence of average contributions is strongly rejected (p< 10 
-5, t=-7.1).12






























































































































































































































































required to reach provision of the public good. Second, of the experiments 3, 5 and 12 in
which subjects locked-in the efficient outcome in the initial periods, only the latter two
exhibit some stability; the dynamics of experiment 3 reveal the instability of the efficient
outcome to unilateral deviations of subjects´ equilibrium strategies: one subject deviates only
once, and the group is never able to coordinate again. On the other hand, Session 10 is also
noteworthy in that subjects are able to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium even though the
outcome for the first two periods is inefficient.
4.2. The Two-Stage VCM-HPP Treatment (TS-VCM-HPP): Experimental Results.
In the TS-VCM-HPP, the right to play the same VCM-HPP as in the control treatment
is, at the first stage, auctioned off amongst a population of 8 subjects. This two-stage-game is,
also as in the control treatment, repeated for twenty periods.
The data on group contributions and market-clearing prices for all 12 experiments
(where P and G denote Price and Group contribution in each session) are summarized
graphically in Figure 3, while Table 2 in Appendix I contains more detailed information.
Before looking at the experimental data in detail, we focus on Figure 4 which shows the
evolution of the average group contribution to the public good in both the control and the two-
stage treatments (denoted as VCM-12 and TS-VCM-12, respectively). Notice that, in each
treatment, the levels of the average group contributions are affected by the occurrence of both
the efficient and inefficient equilibria of the VCM-HPP; hence, whether the dynamics of the
average group contribution in, say, the control treatment tend to a value of 0 (i.e., the
inefficient equilibrium) is obscured by the existence of 3 experiments (respectively 5, 10 and
12) in which the efficient outcome prevailed. Hence we include, also in Figure 4, two
additional measures of average group contributions to the public good: in the first (VCM-9),
for the control treatment, we exclude experiments 5, 10 and 12 so as to include all
experiments but those in which the efficient outcome prevailed. Similarly, for the TS-VCM-
HPP treatment, we report the average group contribution across experiments, excluding
experiment 12 (and labeled TS-VCM-11 in Figure 4), in which subjects´ behavior converged
towards the inefficient equilibrium. In the end, a simple look at Figure 4 reveals that
auctioning the right to play the VCM-HPP has a noticeable effect, significantly increasing the
level of group contributions with respect to the control treatment. Checking the efficiency-
enhancing effect of the auction mechanism, however, requires a comparison between the
relative frequencies of the efficient and inefficient outcomes in both treatments.15































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
VCM-12 TS-VCM-12 VCM-9 TS-VCM-1118
         Figure 3 reports market prices, expressed in the same units as individual players’
payoffs, and the group contribution for all twenty periods in experiments 1 to 12. Even though
the null hypothesis of stochastic equivalence of initial group (and individual) contributions in
the TS-VCM-HPP and the VCM-HPP is not rejected by a one-tailed Mann-Whitney test, we
note that in the period 1 the provision point is attained 6 out of 12 times (experiments 1, 2, 5,
6, 7 and 11), twice as much as in the control treatment. However, and for standard
significance levels, the alternative hypothesis of higher contributions in the TS-VCM-HPP is
supported for periods 5 and 20
15. Allover, the relative frequencies of strategies {40, 30, 20,
10, 0} are {0.8, 0.01, 0.01, 0.02, 0.16} in the TS-VCM-HPP and in the VCM-HPP {0.44,
0.03, 0.03, 0.07, 0.43} respectively, so that contributions in the TS-VCM-HPP dominate
stochastically those in the VCM-HPP.
With respect to subjects´ equilibrium behavior in the second stage VCM-HPP, the data
reveal that the efficient outcome is reached, by period 20, in 9 out of 12 experiments versus 3
in the control treatment.  A stronger impression still, because it suggests convergence to
equilibrium behavior in the VCM-HPP, is conveyed by Sessions 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 in
which subjects´ behavior locks in the efficient equilibrium from period 15 onwards; as Figure
3 reveals, in 3 out of these 7 cases the outcomes in initial periods were inefficient.
What does the evolution of the market-clearing  prices reveal? With few exceptions
(e.g., experiment 4) the initial market prices are always above 40 ECU´s; in these conditions,
it is a strictly dominated strategy in the second stage game for any player to choose any other
contribution level than his/her full endowment of 40  ECU´s so that, in equilibrium, the
efficient outcome should arise. In fact, and whenever the market price is between 40 and 100
ECU´s, the winners of the auction can obtain positive payoffs by coordinating on the full
provision equilibrium. This can be seen from the data (Figure 3 and Table 2 in Appendix I),
which suggest that in most experiments in which convergence to the efficient equilibrium
occurs (e.g., experiments 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11), subjects are able to coordinate before prices
have reached their maximum. However, as the number of repetitions and the competitive
pressures associated with the auction mechanism increase, prices quickly tend to rise until
they reach their maximum, 100 ECU´s, and all subjects´ surplus from playing the efficient
equilibrium is dissipated. This fact, that market prices increase successively to reach the
maximum payoff in the second stage game, replicates one of the strongest results in VHBB´s
(1993) experiments with coordination games.
                                                                
15 The Mann-Whitney test yields a p-value of p<.0326 (.00001) in the 5
th (20
th) period. In addition, for the
trajectory of average contributions the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is +0.72. Thus, the hypothesis of
time independence of average contributions is also rejected (p<.00031, t=4.4).19
Some interesting patterns of individual behavior also emerge from the data. As we
have already discussed in Section 2, the efficient equilibrium in the VCM-HPP is highly
unstable in that a unilateral deviation of the equilibrium  by a single agent, even if it is costly
for him/her, can determine the outcome of the game and thus, have potentially significant
payoff implications for the other players
16. Our data suggest that some players might use such
(costly) punishment devices, mostly in situations in which the efficient equilibrium in the
VCM-HPP prevails and the market price is close to 100 (so that the surplus from entering the
second stage of the game is zero or negligible), possibly in order to punish other members in
the group and force lower market prices in subsequent rounds. Such defections from the
efficient equilibrium are observed, for example, in experiments 2 (periods 10 and 11), 6
(period 8), 7, 9 (period 17), 10 (period 8) and 11 (period 10). Nevertheless, such costly
attempts to push market prices down usually have only transitory effects since the latter tend,
due to competitive pressures, to recover quickly afterwards.
Finally, it is important to note that  subjects´ behavior in experiment 12 clearly
converged to the inefficient outcome of the VCM-HPP while the market-clearing price
quickly converged to 40  ECU´s. As expected,  subjects´ payoffs in the second stage game
were also dissipated by the price they had to pay to enter, so that their surplus was, in
equilibrium, equal to zero.
5. CONCLUSION
We have studied, using experimental methods, equilibrium selection in a class of
public good games, the VCM with a provision point. The previous experimental literature on
this type of environment concludes  that, even though initial contribution levels tend to be
relatively high, the efficient outcome –the only one in which the public good is provided- is
rarely observed, and that the dynamics of  players´ choices tend, as the game is repeated,
towards the inefficient outcome. These “stylized facts” are, indeed, replicated in our control
treatment.
We exploit, in the paper, the structural similarities between the VCM-HPP and some
coordination games with multiple,  Pareto-ranked Nash  equilibria in which strategic
uncertainty plays a crucial role in the inefficiency of the resulting coordination outcomes. In
particular, we extend VHBB (1993) approach and investigate whether the introduction of a
                                                                
16 This was not the case in VHBB (1993) environments, because the median is considerably more robust to
unilateral deviations, so that a single player´s ability to affect the outcome is considerably reduced.20
competitive market used to auction the right to play the public good game can, in fact,
promote efficiency in a VCM-HPP type of environment.
Our results show that, indeed, auctioning the right to play has a significant efficiency-
enhancing effect in that it improves the subjects´ ability to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant
outcome.  Our results for the two stage game also show that, whenever the efficient
equilibrium was attained in the VCM-HPP, all payoffs from the public goods game were
completely dissipated at the first stage because the price paid by the subjects for the right to
play quickly reached its maximum level, an individual  player´s payoff in the efficient
equilibrium. Second, the dynamics in the data suggest that, contrary to what is observed when
the players are endowed with the right to play the VCM-HPP (as in our control treatment), the
competitive pressures induced by the auction market were enough to make the efficient
equilibrium extremely robust to subjects´ unilateral deviations from their equilibrium strategy
profile.
Our experimental results suggest the convenience of, at least, two additional lines of
research. The first is to study the dynamics of  players´ choices, both theoretically and
empirically, in order to learn more (hopefully, within a unified model) about the mechanisms
underlying equilibrium selection both in the VCM-HPP and in the TS-VCM-HPP. The
learning models in Crawford (1995) and  Broseta (2000), which have  already  proved
themselves useful to understand behavior in coordination games in the presence of strategic
uncertainty, might also be a good starting point  for the class of environments studied here.
Second, it may be worthwhile to conduct further experiments in order to check the robustness
of the market driven, efficiency-enhancing mechanism we have introduced in this paper to
changes in the particular VCM-HPP structure used here. More precisely, the introduction of
“intermediate” provision points –in which the provision point is reached without all the
players having to contribute their full endowments- generates additional, asymmetric
equilibria which, often, are not  Pareto-ranked. Whether the introduction of auction
mechanisms –or of other forms of implicit preplay communication- may help subjects to
coordinate in this kind of environment remains an open question.21
APPENDIX I:
Table 1. Data for the VCM-HPP: individual contributions of total endowment; group
contribution [0;160]; individual zero contributions; mean group contribution
Period
Experiment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
VCM-HPP 1
#(ci=40) 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 2 0* 0* 1 1 0 0* 1 0* 0* 0*
￿ci 110 90 10 90 80 100 50 10 10 80 0 0 40 40 10 0 40 0 0 0
VCM-HPP 2
#(ci=40) 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 0* 0* 0* 0 0 0* 1 0* 0* 0* 0 0
￿ci 130 150 140 120 90 110 100 40 0 0 0 20 20 0 40 0 0 0 20 10
VCM-HPP 3
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 3 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
￿ci 160 160 150 140 80 40 40 20 10 60 10 50 50 20 10 30 50 40 40 70
VCM-HPP 4
#(ci=40) 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 3 3
￿ci 150 120 80 90 100 90 80 100 80 80 40 40 40 70 80 40 40 40 120 120
VCM-HPP 5
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
VCM-HPP 6
#(ci=40) 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0* 0
￿ci 150 140 130 80 60 40 10 30 40 30 20 10 10 10 30 40 10 10 0 10
VCM-HPP 7
#(ci=40) 3 2 2 2 2 2 0* 2 2 0* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0* 1
￿ci 120 80 80 80 80 80 0 80 80 0 40 40 40 40 40 40 80 80 0 40
VCM-HPP 8
#(ci=40) 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 0* 1 1 0 1 0* 1 0 0* 0* 0*
￿ci 100 130 110 130 90 80 90 90 80 0 40 40 30 40 0 40 20 0 0 0
VCM-HPP 9
#(ci=40) 0 1 0 0* 1 0 0 0* 0 0 1 1 0 0* 0 0 0* 1 0 1
￿ci 50 70 40 0 40 10 30 0 30 30 50 60 30 0 10 10 0 50 10 50
VCM-HPP10
#(ci=40) 2 2 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 130 90 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
VCM-HPP11
#(ci=40) 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 0* 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 0* 0*
￿ci 140 130 120 120 90 50 40 40 60 50 0 40 70 70 110 70 110 20 0 0
VCM-HPP12
#(c i=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
 #(ci = 40) 33 33 30 32 28 23 20 19 20 18 16 18 17 17 18 17 18 16 15 18
 #(ci =  0) 4 6 10 12 15 16 21 21 22 26 29 26 24 25 24 27 25 27 29 26
Caverage 130 123 112 111 99 90 77 74 73 68 57 65 68 64 68 63 69 60 56 65
#(￿ci = 160) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
*: (symmetric) equilibrium outcome22
Table 2. Data for the TS-VCM-HPP: price; individual contributions of total endowment; group contribution [0;160];
individual zero contributions; mean group contribution
Period
Experiment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
TS-VCM-HPP 1
p1 62 76 95 100 95 100 100 100 95 95 95 95 95 95 100 95 96 98 97 72
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 3 3 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 3 3 3 3
￿ci 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 120 120 120 160 160 160 160 160 120 120 130 130 150
TS-VCM-HPP 2
p2 76 96 100 100 95 100 100 93 100 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 100 95 95
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 120 120 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 3
p3 51 50 40 40 41 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 45 40 40 40 45
#(ci=40) 2 1 0 1 1 0* 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 2 3 3 2 3 4*
￿ci 90 40 20 40 40 0 40 40 80 80 40 40 40 10 80 120 120 80 120 160
TS-VCM-HPP 4
p4 40 40 46 45 45 56 67 77 80 92 95 98 95 100 100 95 100 100 95 100
#(ci=40) 3 2 2 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 120 80 80 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 5
p5 51 76 97 100 100 89 99 87 98 98 99 97 99 98 98 99 98 99 99 98
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 120 150 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 6
p6 81 91 98 97 100 100 99 99 95 97 99 98 99 99 99 100 99 99 99 95
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 7
p7 43 65 91 100 99 99 100 78 98 99 90 96 92 95 95 96 90 86 56 56
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 3 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 2 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 160 160 160 120 160 160 120 160 120 160 160 160 120 160 80 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 8
p8 97 81 94 81 65 62 96 92 93 56 53 85 36 63 88 51 75 99 100 100
#(ci=40) 2 3 1 3 2 4* 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 90 150 90 150 90 160 130 140 60 120 120 90 40 160 150 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP 9
p9 99 94 99 100 95 98 99 99 70 99 99 53 99 99 99 99 99 54 97 91
#(ci=40) 3 4* 3 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 3 3
￿ci 120 160 120 120 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 120 160 120 120
TS-VCM-HPP10
p10 46 40 45 40 53 91 96 99 89 97 96 98 84 99 96 99 95 99 99 97
#(ci=40) 2 1 2 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 80 50 80 160 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP11
p11 86 100 100 100 99 99 57 99 96 100 38 98 91 99 96 94 98 95 98 97
#(ci=40) 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 3 4* 4* 4* 4* 4* 4*
￿ci 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 120 160 160 160 160 160 160
TS-VCM-HPP12
p12 46 40 45 45 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
#(ci=40) 1 2 1 1 0* 1 1 0* 0* 0 0* 0 1 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
￿ci 80 80 40 50 0 50 40 0 0 10 0 10 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
paverage 65 71 79 79 77 81 83 84 83 84 78 83 80 85 87 84 85 84 85 82
#(ci=40) 37 37 33 38 39 40 39 37 38 37 39 38 39 39 41 41 41 39 41 42
#(ci=0) 7 9 11 8 8 7 7 10 9 10 9 8 8 8 6 7 7 8 6 5
Caverage 128 127 116 130 131 134 133 125 128 124 130 128 131 131 139 137 137 131 138 143
#(￿ci = 160) 6 7 6 6 9 9 7 6 8 5 8 8 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 9
*: (symmetric) equilibrium outcome23
APPENDIX II: Translated Instructions and Quiz
Instructions
This experiment has been financed by the University of Arizona (EEUU), the Valencia
Institute for Economic Research (IVIE) and the Valencia Regional Government. Its purpose is
to study the way subjects behave in economic contexts and it will last for about 90 minutes.
Your decisions will determine your monetary rewards at the end of the experiment in the way
we will explain in a moment. You may make us any question raising your hand first. Any
communication is strictly forbidden and it will be penalized with the immediate exclusion of
the experiment.
Each participant has already won 500 pesetas just for been here. If you participate in
the whole session you will be privately paid for your earnings at the end of the experiment.
We will briefly introduce the experiment dynamics right now. After our explanations,
you will be asked to privately answer a simple questionnaire about the instructions to assess
your level of comprehension. As this experimental session is designed for 16 participants we
may ask you to leave the experiment if you make some mistake in the questionnaire. If the
number of subjects with no wrong answers is greater than 16, the participants in the
experimental session will be determined at random.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects are randomly assigned into two
independent groups (so you all have the same probability of being members of each group).
Once these two groups has been assembled, their composition will remain unchanged for the
rest of the experiment.
This experiment lasts for 20 rounds, each of them divided into two stages: the First
Stage and the Second Stage. We will begin with the explanation of the First Stage, to continue
with the Second Stage thereafter, before we proceed with the questionnaire. If you pass the
questionnaire, you will receive an initial endowment of 200 ECU (an Experimental Currency
Unit) and you will immediately begin to participate in the 20 experimental rounds.
The first stage
Only four out of the eight members of each group will be allowed to participate in
each second stage. Each round, an auction will be held during the first stage to determine
which members will participate in the second stage. In the auction, all members of each group24
bid for the right to participate. As the computer will post ascending prices to access to the
second stage, you just have to decide if you agree to pay the posted price to participate or if
you prefer to leave the auction. If you leave the auction, you will have to wait until the round
is over and you will get no profit in the round.
The computer will start with a posted price of 25 ECU and it will increase the posted
price by 5 ECU as the auction goes on. Once three members of each group leaves the auction,
or if the posted price is at least of 95 ECU, the price increases will be of 1 ECU. Auction will
be over when just four subjects keep on it. The last posted price will be the price they will pay
to participate in the second stage.
If after a price increase there are less than four subjects willing to pay the posted price,
a random lottery will decide which of the subjects whom leave the auction in the last price
increase will get into the second stage. In this case, the price subjects will pay to participate in
the second stage will be the last posted price accepted by at least four subjects. If the
computer reaches the maximum price of 100 ECU and there are more than four subjects in the
auction, a random lottery will determine which subjects will access the second stage.
An example: Take that the posted price is 55 ECU and there are still seven subjects in
the auction willing to pay this price to enter the second stage. As the price goes to 60, two of
them leave the auction. As there are just five subjects in the auction, the price increases will
be of 1 ECU. When the posted price goes from 64 to 65 ECU a subject decides to leave. The
price paid by the remaining four subjects will be 65 ECU.
Take now that as price goes up to 65 ECU two subjects leave (so there are only three
subjects in the auction): a random lottery will determine which of these two subjects will
enter the second stage. The price paid by the four subjects to get into the second stage will be
64 ECU.
Meanwhile you are in the auction, you will get instant information about the price
requested to enter the second stage and the number of subjects in the auction. At the end of
each round all of you will get information about the price paid to enter the second stage.
The Second Stage
At the beginning of the second stage, the four remaining subjects will get an initial
endowment of 40 ECU. Your decision in this stage will consist of allocating this 40 ECU
between two alternative funds: the Collective Fund and the Individual Fund.25
Each subject can allocate 00, 10, 20, 30 o 40 ECU to one fund. The rest of the initial
endowment will automatically be allocated to the other. If  you, say, allocate 10 ECU to the
Collective Fund, the remaining 30 ECU will be allocated to the Individual Fund. Any
allocation bigger than 40 ECU to any fund are not allowed.
The Second Stage Profits
Both Funds make profits. If you enter in the second stage your profits in the round will
be the sum of the Individual Fund profits and the Collective Fund profits. Nevertheless,
profits are not the same in both funds. For each ECU allocated to the Individual Fund you get
a profit that only depends on your individual choice: for each ECU assigned to the individual
fund you will get one ECU as return. The profit you will get for each ECU you assign to the
collective fund depends not only on your choices  but on the choices of the other three
members of your group in the following way:
a)  If the aggregate allocation to the Collective Fund of the four subjects is less than
160 ECU each of you will get a profit of 00 ECU.
b)  If the aggregate allocation to the Collective Fund of the four subjects is 160 ECU
each of you will get a profit of 100 ECU.
You can check the profits you may get in the following table:
IF CF 00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
40 00 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 -- -- -- --
30 10 -- 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 -- -- --
20 20 -- -- 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 -- --
10 30 -- -- -- 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 --
00 40 -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Your net profits
At the end of each round you will get a net profit if you enter the second stage: the
difference between the aggregate profits you get in the second stage minus the price you paid
to enter the sateg in the auction.
Your choice The allocation to the collective fund of all four members of the group26
If you do not enter in the second stage in a round you do not get any profit, nor you
pay any price, and your net profits are 0.
If your profits in any second stage are smaller than the price you paid to enter the
second stage you will get losses in the round. The losses will be cancelled with the profits
collected in other rounds (including your initial endowment of 200 ECU). Your initial
earnings of 500 pesetas you received for your assistance will never be involved.
Your accumulated profits will be automatically changed into pesetas at the end of the
experiment at the exchange rate of 1 ECU = 8 pesetas.
Summary: The experimental sequence
Questionnaire (16 subjects); Software explanation; Random matching




•  The computer posts ascending prices to
enter the second stage
•  The posted price comes from 25 to 100




•  Each subject gets an initial endowment
of 40 ECUs and decide upon her
allocation levels
•  Each subject gets her net profits
(second stage profits minus first stage
price)
Subjects get information about Prices and Collective Fund27
Quiz
1.  If you allocate 30 ECU to the Individual Fund, the amount of ECU you allocate to the
Collective Fund will be:
a)  40 ECUS..................................................................................c
b)  80 ECUS..................................................................................c
c)  20 ECUS..................................................................................c
d)  10 ECUS..................................................................................c
2.  If you allocate 20 ECU to the Collective Fund, and all other subjects in your group
allocate the aggregate amount of 10 ECUS to it, your individual profits from the
Collective Fund will be:
a)  40 ECUS..................................................................................c
b)  80 ECUS..................................................................................c
c)  20 ECUS..................................................................................c
d)  00 ECUS..................................................................................c
3.  If you allocate 10 ECU to the Collective Fund, and all other subjects in your group
allocate the aggregate amount of 50 ECU to it, the total profits you get in this round will
be:
a)  60 ECUS..................................................................................c
b)  40 ECUS..................................................................................c
c)  20 ECUS..................................................................................c
d)  30 ECUS..................................................................................c
4.  If you allocate 30 ECU to the Individual Fund, the maximum feasible amount of ECU
your group could allocate to the Collective Fund would be:
a)  150 ECUS................................................................................c
b)  130 ECUS................................................................................c
c)  80 ECUS..................................................................................c
d)  40 ECUS..................................................................................c
5.  If you allocate 30 ECU to the Collective Fund, the aggregate contribution of your group to
the Collective Fund will be:
a)  120 ECUS................................................................................c
b)  90 ECUS..................................................................................c
c)  80 ECUS..................................................................................c
d)  There is no enough information in the question to answer.....c28
APPENDIX III: Software Interface











Round Profits Total Profits
... ... ... ... ... ...
Private Fund ind. contribution / Collective Fund ind. contribution
0/40 10/30 20/20 30/10 40/0
Information

















... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Current Price: 35 No. of Bidders: 8
Posted Price
35 100








Abbink, Klaus and  Abdolkarim  Sadrieh (1995): " RatImage – Research assistance toolbox for
computer-aided human behavior experiments", Discussion Paper B-325, University of Bonn.
Bagnoli, Mark and Michael McKee (1991): "Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private
Provision of Public Goods", Economic Inquiry, 29, 351-366.
Broseta, Bruno (2000): "Learning in experimental coordination games: An ARCH approach", Games
and Economic Behavior, 24-50.
Cachon, Gerard and Colin Camerer (1996): "Loss avoidance and forward induction in experimental
coordination games", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(1), 165-194.
Cadsby, Charles B. and Elizabeth Maynes (1999): "Voluntary provision of threshold public goods
with continuous contributions: experimental evidence", Journal of Public Economics, 71, 53-
73.
Cooper, Russell W., Douglas V.  DeJong, Robert  Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1992a):
"Communication in coordination games", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 739-771.
Cooper, Russell W., Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross (1992b): "Forward
induction in coordination games", Economic Letters, 40(2), 167-172.
Crawford, Vincent (1995): "Adaptive dynamics in coordination games",  Econometrica  63(1), 103-
143.
Crawford, Vincent and Bruno Broseta (1998): "What price coordination? The efficiency-enhancing
effect of auctioning the right to play", American Economic Review 88 (1), 198-225.
Croson, Rachel, and Melanie Marks (1999): "The Effect of Incomplete Information in a Threshold
Public Goods Experiment", Public Choice, 99, 103-118
Croson, Rachel and Melanie Marks (2000): "Step Returns on Threshold Public Goods: A Meta- and
Experimental Analysis", Experimental Economics, 2, 3, 239-259.
Davis, Douglas A. and Charles A. Holt (1993): Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
Isaac, Marc R., Kenneth F.  McCue and Charles R. Plott (1985): " Public goods provision in an
experimental environment", Journal of Public Economics 26, 51-74.30
Isaac, Marc R., James M. Walker and S. Thomas (1984): "Divergent Evidence on Free-Riding: An
Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations", Public Choice, 43, 113-149.
Isaac, Marc R. and James M. Walker (1988): "Communication and free riding behavior: The voluntary
contribution mechanism", Economic Inquiry 26(2): 585-608.
Isaac, Marc R., David Schmidtz and James M. Walker (1989): "The assurance problem in a laboratory
market", Public Choice 62: 217-236.
Isaac, Marc R. and James M. Walker (1991): " Costly communication: An experiment in a nested
public goods problem", in Laboratory research in political economy, T. Palfrey, editor, Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 269-286.
Ledyard, John (1995): "Public Goods: A survey of Experimental Research", in John  Kagel and Al
Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
Marks, Melanie, and Rachel Croson (1998): "Identifiability of Individual Contributions in a Threshold
Public Goods Experiment", Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 167-190
Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio and Richard  Beil (1990): "Tacit coordination games, strategic
uncertainty, and coordination failure", American Economic Review, 80, 234-248.
Van Huyck, John, Raymond  Battalio and Richard  Beil (1991): "Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium
selection principles, and coordination failure in average opinion games", Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 106, 885-911.
Van  Huyck, John, Raymond  Battalio and Richard  Beil (1993): "Asset markets as an equilibrium
selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication",
Games and Economic Behavior, 5(3), 485-504.